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nyone who has any interest in Kosovo knows that the country has been and remains a haven 
for a dreadful complex of clan-based criminality, trafficking and corruption linked to its 
political leadership. The European Commission’s so-called ‘progress reports’ for 2009 and 
now 2010 hardly change, with identical expressions repeated: “Kosovo’s fight against drug trafficking 
is still at an early stage.” The Commission also states in the 2010 report that “political interference ... 
hinders the effective fight against organised crime”. … “Kosovo lacks a track record of conviction 
related to organised crime”, and “there has been limited progress in tackling trafficking of human 
beings”.
1  
As if these progress reports were not damning enough, there is now the Draft Report of the Legal and 
Human Rights Committee for the Council of Europe of 12 December 2010, on the “Inhuman treatment 
of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo”,
2 based on an Explanatory Memorandum 
by Mr Dick Marty, a Swiss member of the Parliamentary Assembly and former state prosecutor. The 
memorandum of Mr Marty blows the whistle loud and clear,  delivering a devastating indictment 
against the leadership of Kosovo, naming in particular the newly re-elected Prime Minister Hashim 
Thaçi.  
For those who have not read the Marty memorandum, here are a few excerpts to sharpen sensitivities 
that may otherwise have been dulled by the restrained language of the Commission’s progress reports: 
Most pertinent to our research, we found that a small but inestimably powerful group of KLA 
personalities apparently wrested control of most of the illicit criminal enterprises in which 
Kosovar Albanians were involved in the Republic of Albania, beginning at the latest in 1998. 
This group of prominent KLA personalities styled itself as the Drenica Group, evoking 
connections with the Drenica Valley in Kosovo. We found that the Drenica Group has as its 
chief – or, to use the terminology of organised crime networks, its boss – the renowned 
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political operator and perhaps most internationally recognised personality of the KLA, 
Hashim Thaçi (paragraphs 56-63 of the Marty memorandum)”. 
The report goes on to describe gruesome human organ trafficking activity that are believed to have 
been ongoing in 1999 using facilities at Fushe-Kruje in Albania, not far from Tirana, where the 
proprietor allegedly shared both clan ties and organised criminal connections with members of the 
Drenica Group. Captives brought from Kosovo were summarily executed by a KLA gunman, and their 
corpses transported swiftly to the operating clinic for kidney extractions, with the organs thence 
exported from Tirana airport (paragraphs 159-167 of the Marty memorandum).  
These alleged crimes would plunge the terrible history of the Yugoslavia war crimes to new depths.  
What next?  
Option 0 would see continuation of the status quo, business as usual. The Council of Europe report 
would be shelved together with some lofty political declarations. 
Option 1 could be based on the recommendation in the draft report of the Council of Europe, which 
recognises a central role of the EU’s ‘EULEX’ mission in Kosovo “to persevere with its investigative 
work, without taking any account of the offices held by possible suspects or of the origin of the 
victims, doing everything to cast light on the criminal disappearances, the indications of organ 
trafficking, corruption and the collusion so often complained of between organised criminal groups 
and political circles” (paragraph 19.2.1). However this wording is quite weak; it does not explicitly 
advocate prosecutorial action, although EULEX prosecutors are empowered to investigate and 
prosecute a number of crimes, including war crimes, crimes against humanity and organised crime.    
Option 2 would see the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) open a prosecutorial 
investigation. This would enable the scope of the investigation to extend into Albania – which, like 
any State, is under an international obligation to cooperate with the ICTY, whereas EULEX only has 
the authority to work in Kosovo. The ICTY is of course preparing itself for closure and will see the 
establishment of an International Residual Mechanism by 1 July 2013, but its mission seems not yet 
accomplished with this most hideous of crimes left unpursued at the level of the most senior leaders. 
Surely the ICTY would be expected to work in close collaboration with EULEX,  
In practice complementary and cooperative action by ICTY and EULEX together would make the 
most sense, since ICTY could take up the cases involving the most senior leaders, and EULEX could 
handle lesser cases at the local level, while both would share information.   
Option 3 would additionally see the EU respond to its broader political responsibilities, with political 
action following the launching of prosecutorial action by ICTY and EULEX.  
This would take into account the fact that the EU and its member states are in the middle of a multi-
year programme of financial aid to Kosovo, following a donor conference in 2008 at which the EU 
and its member states together pledged €508 million for the years 2009 to 2011. This assistance covers 
a wide range of programmes and projects for economic infrastructure, political institution building, the 
rule of law (with the major EULEX mission), education, public health, etc.  
With the political leadership of Hashim Thaçi subject to prosecutorial enquiry, the EU would signal 
that it expected the Prime Minister to resign while the case was under investigation. But it would go 
further than this, and signal that a new government of Kosovo would have to be led by a Mr Clean, 
who would get serious over all the current rule of law problems that are well documented. These 
would moreover be conditions for continuation of various parts of the substantial economic aid 
programmes now underway.  
Furthermore, this renewal of the Kosovo leadership would be conducive to progress in the UN-
mandated and EU-mediated dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, which is due to begin its work early 
in 2011, with a view to sorting out the outstanding problems between the two parties. For this the 
Kosovo party needs a new, credible and respected leadership.   
This last Option 3, combined with legal action by the ICTY and EULEX, would be consistent with the 
EU’s self-appointed role as leading force for the political transformation and economic integration of 
the whole of the Western Balkans into modern Europe and its values. 